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FEDERALISM FROM FEDERAL STATUTES:  
HEALTH REFORM, MEDICAID, AND THE       
OLD-FASHIONED FEDERALISTS’ GAMBLE 
Abbe R. Gluck* 
 
How can the states retain relevance in an era of federal statutory law?  
The persistence of the states and our enduring attachment to “federalism” in 
an increasingly national and global regulatory environment has occupied 
the minds of many scholars.1  For the most part, however, the U.S. Supreme 
Court, because of its role as the final expositor of constitutional meaning, 
has been viewed as the primary arbiter of what federalism is and what is 
required to protect it.  Less often explored has been Congress’s role in 
giving meaning to federalism in the modern administrative state.2  
Specifically, the possibility to which this Essay wishes to draw attention is 
that federal statutes may now be the primary way in which state power is 
created and protected.  To be clear, the claim is not about federal statutes 
that are modest in ambition and leave most areas exclusively to state 
regulation.  Rather, the claim is about major federal statutes that, even as 
they extend federal power, entrust to the states much of their 
implementation and elaboration. 
The 2010 health reform legislation—The Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act3 (ACA)—is the most prominent recent example of 
 
*  Associate Professor of Law, Yale Law School.  With thanks to Meir Feder, Heather 
Gerken, Nicole Huberfeld, Sara Rosenbaum, Ted Ruger, Yale Law School students Josh 
Rosenthal and Rebecca Wolitz, Ben Zipursky and the Fordham Law Review, and especially 
to Jerry Mashaw, Henry Monaghan, Nate Persily, Judith Resnik, and, for outstanding 
research assistance, Andrew Hammond.  Special thanks to Ollie and Ryan Feder for their 
continuing interest in “the law about doctors and hospitals.” 
 1. For a well-known example of one such treatment, see Larry Kramer, Putting the 
Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 227, 234 
(2000) (arguing that the political-party system has given the states an enduring voice on the 
national level). 
 2. As shall be evident, my point is different from the famous “political safeguards” 
argument. See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism:  The Role of the 
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 
(1954) (arguing that state representation in Congress and the nature of the political process 
work to protect state autonomy).  I assume that national action is the “ordinary,” not the 
“special,” case and am interested in how such national action itself might generate and 
protect the benefits and values that are more typically associated with autonomy-focused 
theories of federalism. 
 3. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 26 and 42 U.S.C.). 
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such a statute.  And the Supreme Court’s 2012 decision about the 
constitutionality of that statute revealed that the Court emphatically 
disagrees with this Essay’s claim.4  But federalism proponents may be 
doing their own cause a disservice with their reluctance to see federalism in 
federal statutes. 
Congress seems to have taken a different view.  Since the New Deal, 
Congress has repeatedly invited the states to be the front-line implementers 
of its new federal laws—federal-statutory design decisions that are often 
described by legislators as respectful of “federalism,” even as the new 
national legislation displaces traditional state dominance over a particular 
area of policy.  Health reform, for example, invited the states to serve as 
central policy-makers and implementers in key areas of the statute, 
including its expansion of Medicaid and its establishment of insurance 
exchanges (the law’s new “one stop shopping” portals for insurance 
purchase).5 
The Court, however, as well as some other self-identified state-power 
proponents, appears to believe that state power is undermined, not 
advanced, when Congress invites states into federal statutes in this manner.  
But from a federalism-protective perspective, the Court’s position may well 
have the reverse of its intended effect.  Insisting on separation is unlikely to 
stop Congress from legislating altogether.  At most, it will encourage 
Congress to legislate without state partners—a course of action that is likely 
to increase, not decrease, national power. 
The issue that brought these matters to the fore in health reform was the 
ACA’s proposed Medicaid expansion.  Medicaid is a half-century-old 
federal program that is jointly administered by states and the federal 
government, and has been incrementally expanded since its inception.  
Medicaid’s paradigmatic “cooperative federalism” and its slow course of 
development are the direct result of policymakers’ continued efforts to 
bring the federal government into an arena dominated by the states while 
still respecting “federalism.”  But, in the health reform litigation, the Court 
held that Congress’s most recent expansion of Medicaid went too far and in 
the process implied that Congress loses some power over how it may 
expand federal programs once it invites states to participate.6  In the name 
of federalism, seven Justices held that states were effectively free to reject 
the amendments to the Medicaid statute that Congress had passed and the 
President had signed. 
The Court’s opinion, however, relied on a vision of federalism that has 
been on the decline at least since the New Deal.  The Court insisted that 
federalism and its benefits—including local control and the ability of states 
 
 4. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 5. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2201. 
 6. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2606–07 (opinion of Roberts, C.J., joined by Breyer & Kagan, 
JJ.) (finding the Medicaid expansion unconstitutional); id. at 2666–67 (Scalia, Kennedy, 
Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting) (joining the part of the Roberts opinion finding the 
Medicaid expansion unconstitutional). 
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to check federal power—are best effectuated by state separation from 
federal law rather than state participation in it. That vision depends on what 
no longer exists:  significant areas of regulation that are reserved to the 
states and into which federal lawmaking may not tread.  Today, the states’ 
relevance on the national policymaking level comes mostly from 
Congress’s discretion, not from the states’ exclusive control over policy as 
a matter of (judicially monopolized) boundary-emphasizing constitutional 
law.  Congress may design federal statutes that retain central roles for states 
or Congress may design federal statutes that displace the state function 
entirely. 
Health reform typifies this modern state of affairs.  In designing the 
statute, Congress followed its typical legislative path—one of incremental 
federal lawmaking over a historical backdrop of state control—a path that, 
as in the case of numerous social programs enacted over the past century, 
produced a new federal statute that took some power from the states with 
one hand but gave the states new (federal-law-granted) powers with the 
other.  The Court interpreted these moves as fundamentally antifederalist.  
But would federalism really have been better served had Congress pushed 
the states to the periphery? 
Since the decision, moreover, some state-power proponents have taken 
similar positions to the Court’s with respect to other aspects of the statute.  
Specifically, the majority of Republican-controlled states have rejected 
Congress’s offer to let the states, rather than the federal government, run the 
Act’s new health insurance exchanges.7  Their effort, like the Court’s, is to 
fight a battle already lost; that is, to try to derail the progress of this federal 
lawmaking altogether.  But the Court upheld the constitutionality of the rest 
of the health reform statute, including the exchange provisions.  The states’ 
decision not to participate thus opens the door to a wholesale federal 
takeover of health insurance regulation in those same states that opposed 
the federal law in the first place.  What’s more, that opening may pave the 
way for additional federal encroachment that might not otherwise occur if 
states implemented the Act themselves. 
The gamble is a big one.  Unlike the contest over Congress’s power to 
enact an insurance-purchase mandate—which received far more public 
attention but is unlikely to arise again8—this federalism question is certain 
to recur.  Most major federal programs in this country rely at least in part on 
the kind of state-led implementation that the Court’s opinion attempted to 
 
 7. Since the Court held in Printz v. United States that Congress cannot commandeer 
state executive authority, Congress has given the states the choice to administer new federal 
programs or to opt out. 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997).  In the health reform statute, Congress 
articulated a default-preference for state implementation of the exchanges but provided that 
the federal government would run the exchanges for the states if the states opted out or were 
unprepared to implement by the 2014 deadline. 
 8. The question whether Congress has authority under the Commerce Clause to require 
individuals to purchase health insurance is unlikely to arise again because such purchase-
mandates are rarely necessary and, in any event, Congress now knows to use a different 
power (such as its taxing power) to effectuate the same result. 
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deter.  The Court’s opinion already has injected significant uncertainty into 
these cooperative federalism schemes and may result in Congress using less 
of them in the future. 
This is not to say that Congress’s efforts to include the states always 
effectuate federalist, as opposed to nationalist, goals, or that it is easy to tell 
which federal-statutory moves are state protective.  Different states might 
take divergent views of different statutes and, of course, not everyone will 
agree that state-protective policy solutions are normatively ideal for every 
policy problem.  Nor is it to say that Congress must not do a better job in 
making clear how much power it intends to delegate to the states relative to 
federal agencies or other implementers when it offers them roles in federal 
administration.  The point, rather, is that these federal-statutory-
implementation relationships are the critical federalism relationships of the 
statutory era.  The real work to be done is not in eliminating these 
partnerships altogether, but in recognizing Congress’s centrality in creating 
them and the need for legal rules to govern their successful operation. 
I.  THE STAKES FOR HEALTH POLICY AND FOR CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
Health reform offered both Congress and the Supreme Court the 
opportunity to address the modern conundrum of the states’ place in a legal 
world dominated by federal statutes.  Congress did so as a matter of health 
policy; the Court did so as a matter of constitutional law.  Neither did so 
with particular clarity. 
A.  Health Policy 
Federalism has been the subject of robust debate in the health policy 
context for decades.  The question in the policy context has typically been 
framed as a functional one; that is, which level of government, state or 
federal, is best situated to oversee health care regulation and finance?  
Proponents of state regulation have emphasized the benefits of local 
variation and the expertise of local health administrators in arguing for state 
control.  On the other side, nationalists emphasize that local regulation does 
not work given the countercyclical nature of programs like Medicaid:  
expenses for assistance programs increase during difficult economic times 
when governments (especially states with balanced-budget requirements) 
have less revenue to cover them.  Nationalists also argue that state-level 
health reform is impossible given the national market for health care:  
providers and insurers will simply leave aggressive states if other states 
have fewer restrictions.9 
Congress essentially punted the answer to this health-policy question 
when it enacted the ACA.  As detailed below, the statute is a paradigm of 
the kind of structural schizophrenia that results from incremental federal 
 
 9. For examples from this robust literature, see FEDERALISM AND HEALTH POLICY (John 
Holahan et al. eds., 2003), and HEALTH POLICY, FEDERALISM, AND THE AMERICAN STATES 
(Robert F. Rich & William D. White eds., 1996). 
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lawmaking—over terrain historically controlled by the states—by a 
Congress sensitive to undercutting federalism.  The ACA offers few 
answers to the functional question of where health administration ideally 
should be located.  Instead, as detailed below, the statute not only increases 
federal authority, but also gives authority to the state and federal 
governments acting together and leaves some authority in state hands alone, 
as well as in the hands of private actors. 
Of course, depending on the policy question at hand, such a varied 
structural approach is not always undesirable.  In the context of health 
reform, however, the pre-ACA landscape of regulatory structural 
fragmentation had been much lamented,10 and Congress disappointed the 
many health policy experts who had hoped that the ACA would address the 
field’s structural issues head-on.  Congress did not, for example, address 
why, as a matter of good policy, the nation’s health insurance program for 
the elderly (Medicare) is run by the federal government, while the nation’s 
health insurance program for the poor (Medicaid) is run jointly with the 
states.  Instead, the structure of the ACA (which extended both programs) 
was the product of what might be called authority-allocating, federalism-
inspired path dependence:  Congress gave the states a lead role in the new 
federal statute in those same areas in which states had previously exerted 
primary authority, namely, Medicaid and insurance regulation. 
B.  Law 
On the legal side, this question of the modern state-federal relationship 
has been framed differently, as one of constitutional structure; namely, 
whether the Constitution’s protections of state sovereignty limit the way in 
which the federal government uses (or does not use) the states to administer 
or implement federal legislation.  But the more provocative way to ask the 
same question is to ask what the continuing relevance is at all of legal 
doctrines that protect “federalism” in an era in which our most important 
laws come from federal legislation that Congress has the power to enact 
without any role for the states in the first place. 
“Constitutional” federalism is typically a federalism defined by the 
allocation of powers in our founding document and one that has been 
understood by many to prescribe separate spheres of state and federal 
responsibility and to have as its goal the preservation of state autonomy.  
But, as many scholars have noted, that brand of federalism is increasingly 
irrelevant.  The New Deal brought the federal government squarely into 
most areas of traditional state regulation, including the world of social 
policy, and today, if statutes are crafted properly, there are few areas into 
which the federal government may not go.  As such, the apposite question is 
not how federalism should protect what are now mostly nonexistent areas of 
 
 10. See THE FRAGMENTATION OF U.S. HEALTH CARE:  CAUSES AND SOLUTIONS (Einer 
Elhauge ed., 2010). 
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exclusive state authority.11  Rather, the apposite question is whether there 
might be a new type of federalism—which might be called intrastatutory 
federalism—that functions within the world of federal statute making.  Is 
there a federalism in which state power comes from federal statutes—from 
Congress’s decision to design federal laws that rely on state 
administration—rather than a federalism in which state power derives from 
its separation from federal law? 
In the health reform case, seven Justices refused to acknowledge the 
possibility of this modern expression of our foundational state-federal 
relationship.  The joint dissent (for Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and 
Alito) expressly disputed the proposition that Congress’s decision to allow 
“state employees to implement a federal program is more respectful of 
federalism than using federal workers alone,” and asserted that “[t]his 
argument reflects a view of federalism that our cases have rejected.”12  The 
Chief Justice’s opinion, like the joint dissent, extolled the “independent 
power of the States . . . as a check on the power of the Federal 
Government.”13 
Both opinions read as homages to federalism.  But the federalism that the 
Court embraced was federalism in its bygone, separate-spheres form.  The 
structural choice for Congress in health reform was not, as the Court would 
have it, “federal legislation versus state legislation.”  Rather, the structural 
question was “federal legislation administered by whom?” 
Congress answered that question in health reform by including the states 
as front-line partners in the implementation of several parts of the statute, 
including in its Medicaid expansion.  Congress did not need to do this, as 
all nine Justices acknowledged:  the federal government unquestionably had 
the constitutional power to implement the Medicaid expansion all by itself.  
But the Court viewed Congress’s attempt to expand Medicaid in its joint 
state-federal form as an encroachment on federalism.  Specifically, 
Congress conditioned continued state involvement in Medicaid on a state’s 
acquiescence to Congress’s new amendments to the program.  The Court 
viewed this as a coercive trap that violated state sovereignty:  given 
Medicaid’s centrality in every state, the Court opined, states had little 
choice but to go along with Congress’s amendments. 
I have previously written about the way in which state implementation of 
national law may, indeed, sometimes be a tool of national encroachment.14  
But one also must consider the alternative, and that is the point of this 
Essay:  in a world of near limitless federal power to spend money for social 
 
 11. For an excellent treatment of the opposite view, see MALCOLM M. FEELEY & 
EDWARD RUBIN, FEDERALISM:  POLITICAL IDENTITY AND TRAGIC COMPROMISE (2008) 
(arguing federalism without autonomy is simply decentralization). 
 12. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2642, 2660 (2012) (joint dissent). 
 13. Id. at 2578 (majority opinion).  
 14. Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation:  State 
Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534 (2011). 
 2013] FEDERALISM FROM FEDERAL STATUTES 1755 
welfare,15 and given Congress’s proven tendency to legislate incrementally 
(i.e., through a series of amendments over time) what good does the Court’s 
opinion do the states, or the cause of federalism?  Now that the Court has 
limited Congress’s flexibility to legislate incrementally when it utilizes state 
partners, perhaps Congress will think twice before including the states at all 
the next time. 
The Court did not acknowledge this possibility, or the possibility that 
state administration of federal law might sometimes empower, rather than 
undermine, state players.16  Instead, the Court may have assumed that 
erecting barriers to state implementation of federal law would stop 
Congress from enacting major federal legislation altogether.  This is a 
dubious assumption at best.  Every modern president—from President 
Nixon and the Clean Air Act,17 to President George W. Bush and No Child 
Left Behind,18 to President Obama and the ACA19—has passed major 
federal legislation.  The New Deal tide will not so easily be turned back. 
II.  INTRASTATUTORY FEDERALISM AS THE FEDERALISM OF 
THE MODERN ERA 
In legal circles, only a handful of commentators have even acknowledged 
the possibility that federal statutes, in general, might be a source of 
constitutional interpretation and change.20  Even among that number, 
matters of federal statutory design are rarely described as federalism 
constituting.  Still rarer—because it is so antithetical to the state autonomy 
typically associated with federalism—is a lawyer’s understanding of 
federalism as a relationship that comes by the grace of Congress. 
But most major policy initiatives since the New Deal seem to embrace 
this possibility.  From the early family and old-age assistance laws, to the 
 
 15. This is because Congress can tax and spend as it wishes for the general welfare, see 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, a power that even the conservative wing of the Court agrees 
gives Congress enormous authority over social policy. See, e.g., NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2643 
(joint dissent). 
 16. There is some evidence that this notion of empowerment, though perhaps counter-
intuitive to some, may be taking broader hold.  Heather Gerken, for example, makes a 
similar point in a speech written independently at approximately the same time as this Essay. 
See Heather Gerken, The Federalis(m) Society, 36 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming 
2013) (on file with author); see also Ted Ruger, Health Policy Devolution and the 
Institutional Hydraulics of the Affordable Care Act, in THE HEALTH CARE CASE (Persily et 
al. eds., forthcoming 2013) (predicting that states will use waivers under health reform for 
leverage). 
 17. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as 
amended in 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671 (2006)). 
 18. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) 
(codified in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.). 
 19. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 
(2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.). 
 20. See 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:  THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 
(forthcoming 2014) (on file with author); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE & JOHN FEREJOHN, A 
REPUBLIC OF STATUTES:  THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2010); Ernest A. Young, The 
Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408 (2007). 
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environmental statutes of the 1970s, to the health reform legislation of 
2010, Congress has invoked federalism in giving states the option of 
serving as primary implementers of the most important federal programs.  
Moreover, in the same spirit of federalism, Congress often gives states 
flexibility to do this federal work; for example, by establishing federal 
floors above which states may innovate or by allowing states to apply for 
waivers from federal requirements so that they can experiment with ways to 
accomplish the federal law’s goals.  In turn, the states have constructed 
local administrative bureaucracies to implement federal policy and, 
concomitantly, have become ever more expert in the areas entrusted to their 
administration.  In this fashion, Congress has allowed the states to remain 
important players in the current policymaking world.21 
A.  Motivations 
There are many good and varied reasons why Congress relies on the 
states to implement federal law.22  Some of these reasons are pragmatic:  
the federal government does not have sufficient personnel to administer its 
programs, and state administrators often are more expert.  Some reasons are 
functional:  certain programs may benefit from regional variation (water 
policy, for example, may look different in the Northeast and the 
Southwest); or Congress may wish to incentivize state-level 
experimentation in federal policy administration to generate data for future 
national policy decisions. 
Other motivations may be instrumental.  State administration of new 
federal programs may make federal legislative expansions more politically 
palatable for those who prefer (at least the appearance of) “small” 
government.  Running controversial federal programs through the states 
also may diffuse federal accountability.  Sometimes, these moves are 
“nationalist” in nature:  a use of the states to increase federal power in a 
below-the-radar fashion.  Other times (or perhaps simultaneously), they 
may be an effort to effectuate values that we normally associate with 
“federalism,” even as Congress steps in to regulate.  For example, a federal 
law that relies on state implementation might be a way of expressing a 
preference for experimentation, local control, or respect for areas of 
traditional state expertise. 
The point is not that Congress’s reliance on state administration is always 
“ideal” from a state-power perspective or that there is a single model to 
evaluate.  Some statutes delegate power equally to all implementing states; 
others give certain states leadership roles developing national policy.23  
 
 21. Cooperative federalism existed before the New Deal too, but it has become 
ubiquitous since. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Reluctant Nationalists:  Federal Administration and 
Administrative Law in the Republican Era, 1801–1829, 116 YALE L.J. 1636, 1649–50 (2007) 
(describing early cooperative federalism in quarantine laws). 
 22. For elaboration, see Gluck, supra note 14. 
 23. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7543(e)(2)(A) (2006) (providing California a 
special authorization to “adopt and enforce” emissions standards). 
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Some statutes give states much policymaking discretion, while others use 
states to administer what are essentially uniform national programs.  In the 
ACA alone, we see this type of dizzying variety.24  The point is that 
congressional reliance on state implementation is ubiquitous and complex, 
and that legal doctrine currently offers no tools that assist in evaluating its 
many forms.  The point is also that state implementation, at least some of 
the time, can offer states a voice in national policymaking. 
B.  Is This “Federalism”? 
Some will likely contest that this is “federalism” at all.  Protesters may 
offer “decentralization” as a preferred label,25 precisely because the state 
presence comes at Congress’s pleasure.  But more is going on here than the 
managerial allocation of responsibility.  In fact, it seems unmistakable that 
federalism norms are being expressed in at least some of these statutes. 
Consider, as an example, the question whether to centralize 
administration of the ACA’s newly created insurance exchanges in the 
federal government or whether to give the states the right of first refusal to 
exercise control over their administration—a question that was not at issue 
in the litigation.  This exchange governance was the key question that 
divided the House and Senate versions of the legislation, with the Senate 
invoking “federalism” values to insist on the state-leadership default 
preference that ultimately carried the day.  But make note:  this federalism 
was to come in the form of state administration of federal law—not in the 
exclusion of the federal government from the field. 
And let’s be clear.  As a matter of existing constitutional doctrine, most 
people agree that the federal government could implement programs like 
the environmental statutes or health reform all by itself.  In the health 
reform case, what divided the Court was not whether Congress had the 
constitutional power to expand access to government-provided health 
insurance but rather how Congress did it. 
Perhaps the Court would have reached a different answer had it thought 
about the question in terms of that choice.  Consider again, in this light, the 
health insurance exchanges.  As a result of the triumph of the state-led 
version of those exchanges, individuals and small businesses in those states 
that accept Congress’s invitation to run the exchanges will continue to 
purchase health insurance through state-governed channels, a result that, at 
least on the surface, appears consistent with the traditional presumption 
(itself legislatively established through Congress’s discretion in the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945) that health-insurance regulation is an area 
of state control.  As a matter of formal constitutional doctrine, of course, an 
exchange run by the federal government would be no different:  federal 
law—the ACA—will regulate the exchanges no matter who runs them.  But 
as a matter of how individual Americans will experience this regulation, it 
 
 24. Gluck, supra note 14. 
 25. FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 11, at 20–37 (2008). 
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will be on the local level.  And as a matter of what level of government is 
setting much of the relevant policy, it is still the states, precisely because 
Congress—even though it didn’t have to—built state-implementation 
flexibility into the statute.  The same point can be made about the difference 
between expanding access to health insurance through Medicaid, which 
puts states at the forefront, as opposed to through Medicare, which does not. 
The Chief Justice himself began his opinion by writing that traditional 
federalism assures that “the facets of governing that touch on citizens daily 
lives are normally administered by smaller governments closer to the 
governed.”26  The Court seemed too quick, however, to conclude that 
erecting barriers to state implementation of federal law would serve that 
goal.  Fifteen years earlier, in Printz v. United States,27 another highly 
contested case about state administration of federal law, the dissenting 
Justices (including Justice Breyer, who joined the Chief Justice in the 
ACA’s Medicaid ruling) put the question more realistically.  “Why, or 
how,” the dissent asked, “would what the majority sees as a constitutional 
alternative—the creation of a new federal . . . law bureaucracy, or the 
expansion of an existing federal bureaucracy—better promote either state 
sovereignty or individual liberty?”28  The Printz dissenters also might have 
asked how it would better promote administration of law by those 
governments closest to the people. 
It remains a subject for debate whether the kinds of “everyday” 
experiences with state administration that the state exchanges and Medicaid 
will offer are federalism in the “constitutional” sense.  But it is not clear 
that the labels really matter.29  One can argue that the prevalence of these 
kinds of arrangements has shaped and changed what federalism means as a 
matter of “constitutional law,” or one can argue alternatively that, if 
 
 26. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2578 (2012). 
 27. 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 28. Id. at 977 (Breyer, J., dissenting joined by Stevens, J.); see also id. at 959 (Stevens, 
J., dissenting joined by Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.) (“By limiting the ability of the 
Federal Government to enlist state officials in the implementation of its programs, the Court 
creates incentives for the National Government to aggrandize itself.  In the name of State’s 
rights, the majority would have the Federal Government create vast national bureaucracies to 
implement its policies.  This is exactly the sort of thing that the early Federalists promised 
would not occur, in part as a result of the National Government’s ability to rely on the 
magistracy of the States.”). Cf. Judith Resnik, Lessons in Federalism from the 1960s Class 
Action Rule and the 2005 Class Action Fairness Act:  “The Political Safeguards” of 
Aggregate Translocal Actions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1929, 1966 (2008) (arguing that, by 
including the states, “[a] national response can emerge without turning everything into a 
‘federal case.’”). 
 29. The doctrinal relevance of labeling in this context seems to go to the alterability of 
the doctrines announced.  To the extent that one believes that Congress’s federal statutory 
design decisions are creating new constitutional understandings of federalism, then perhaps 
future congresses, and even courts, have less power to alter those understandings than they 
would have to interpret and change statutory understandings.  This possibility raises a host of 
other questions, however—including the presumptive unconstitutionality of congressional 
efforts to bind the hands of future congresses—that require deeper consideration elsewhere 
(and which also attach to most theories of statutes-as-constitutional-law, see supra note 20, 
not just the one advanced here). 
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constitutional federalism is only about federalism in the sense of autonomy, 
then that brand of federalism is increasingly irrelevant.  But the potential 
irrelevance of constitutional federalism in its narrowest sense does not 
mean that something often very state centered has not replaced it. 
III.  THE ACA’S TAPESTRY OF FEDERALISM 
Of course, the reason that the Supreme Court had occasion to address the 
intrastatutory federalism question at all is because of how the ACA was 
designed. 
A.  The ACA’s Structural Fragmentation 
For the past century, two overarching questions have dominated the 
health-policy discourse.  The first question is that of the health care 
system’s basic normative framework:  whether we should have a system 
that rests on “personal responsibility” (everyone for him/herself) or, instead, 
whether a “solidarity” model (one that emphasizes “mutual aid and 
support”) should govern.30  The second question is the structural one, and 
asks which level of government, state or federal (or perhaps the private 
sector), should be responsible for ensuring access to health care for those 
deemed entitled to receive it. 
Congress tackled both questions when it passed the ACA.  Or, more 
accurately, it tried to answer the first and declined to answer the second.  
The ACA offers the strongest federal legislative position thus far on the 
personal responsibility-versus-solidarity debate.  The statute’s primary goal 
is universal access to health care (i.e., solidarity), which it accomplishes by 
making health insurance available to as many Americans as possible.31  The 
Medicaid expansion at issue in the litigation was one part of that effort, 
along with other aspects of the statute, including amendments to Medicare, 
the establishment of the health insurance exchanges, the provision of 
subsidies for the purchase of insurance, and the imposition of new 
requirements on insurers to make insurance more accessible.  To make the 
reforms economically viable for insurers, the law expands the pool of 
insured citizens, requiring almost all individuals to have insurance (or be 
covered through one of the federal assistance programs), a requirement 
colloquially referred to as the “individual mandate.”32 
 
 30. Wendy K. Mariner, Social Solidarity and Personal Responsibility in Health Reform, 
14 CONN. INS. L.J. 199, 205, 207 (2008). 
 31. The statute is not unequivocal on this point.  Some provisions, particularly the so-
called “wellness provisions” that allow healthy individuals to reduce their insurance costs, 
reflect a reluctance to leave the personal responsibility model completely behind. See 
generally Tom Baker, Health Insurance, Risk and Responsibility After the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1577 (2011); Jessica L. Roberts, Health Law As 
Disability Rights Law, MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013). 
 32. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 10106(b), 124 
Stat. 119, 909–11 (2010) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (Supp. V 2011)). 
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But Congress essentially punted the second, structural, health-policy 
question.  The ACA is a Solomonic and mostly unsatisfying response to the 
functional question of whether the states or the federal government are best 
situated to oversee health care, or even to the preliminary question of 
whether government (any government) should be involved in health care in 
the first place. 
Instead, the ACA offers something for everyone, and does not justify as a 
functional matter why it divides the world the way it does.  The statute 
includes all of the following government-structure models:  a federal-only 
model in the statute’s Medicare reforms; a cooperative-federalism model in 
the statute’s Medicaid expansion and health insurance exchange provisions; 
a new “hybrid” federalism model, created in the ACA’s implementing 
regulations, that allows states to take the lead but allows the federal 
government to perform certain tasks that benefit from centralization or 
economies of scale across groups of states; and a state-only model that 
expressly leaves certain functions entirely in state hands.33  The statute also 
includes a private market model in its reliance on employer-provided, 
private insurance as the default system. (Indeed, the fact that the statute 
calls the insurance-purchase mandate a “personal responsibility” 
requirement is likely no coincidence; the label, and the maintenance of the 
private insurance system, appear to be nods toward those who would prefer 
a private-market, antisolidarity model altogether.) 
The Court’s opinion was essentially a reflection on these two health-
policy questions, reframed in legal terms.  With respect to the first question, 
Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion and the joint dissent, in discussing both the 
mandate and the Medicaid expansion, each evinced profound discomfort 
with Congress’s policy preference for the solidarity model, and each 
repeatedly blanched at the notion of the healthy subsidizing the sick.  The 
link between that normative discomfort and the constitutional-law holdings 
in the opinions is a fascinating subject, but one beyond the scope of this 
Essay.  The remainder of the Essay focuses on the second, structural 
question:  namely, the ACA’s use of intrastatutory federalism and the 
Court’s reaction to it. 
B.  The Link Between Federalism and Federal Policy Incrementalism 
What explains the ACA’s structural diversity?  It does not appear that 
any health policy expert has claimed that it was the result of a considered 
policy decision.  Instead, the statute’s something-for-everyone approach to 
the state’s role seems to have been the result of politics (getting to the right 
number of votes) and path dependence.  Specifically, the road to the ACA’s 
structural fragmentation was typical of the incremental way in which 
Congress legislates.  The Court did not seem to understand this, or at least 
did not acknowledge it.  Nor did the Court recognize that such 
 
 33. For more detail about the fragmented structure of the Act, see generally Gluck, 
supra note 14. 
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incrementalism tends to favor the development of federal statutes that 
include central, albeit sometimes fragmented, roles for the states. 
1.  Incrementalism and State Entrenchment 
Political scientists have consistently demonstrated that Congress 
legislates in piecemeal fashion.34  There are many reasons for the 
persistence of this policy incrementalism, including the numerous barriers 
to lawmaking of any sort in Congress and the difficulty of attaining 
consensus in a polity as diverse as ours.  Of particular relevance here, there 
is also an explicit link between Congress’s tendency toward policy 
incrementalism and the design of federal statutes that rely on state 
administration.  This is largely because what often precedes our incremental 
federal legislation, especially in the social policy arena, is decades of 
lawmaking, expertise building, and institution entrenching by the states that 
previously occupied the field. 
The historical backdrop of state social policy regulation creates both 
political and pragmatic incentives for Congress to rely on, rather than to 
displace, entrenched state administrative apparatus.  As a political matter, 
the same federalism-like concerns about big government and respect for 
traditional areas of state authority often are cited to support state 
administration of federal law.  Pragmatically, in addition to the lack of 
sufficient federal personnel, earlier-established state bureaucracies provide 
ready experts to implement new federal legislation should the states wish to 
participate. 
The result can be a policy scheme that is structurally fragmented in 
multiple ways.  The new federal program, like the ACA, may have some 
aspects designed to be implemented by the states and other aspects designed 
to be implemented by the federal government.  Even with respect to those 
aspects designed to be implemented by the states, states sometimes opt out, 
in which case the federal government must step in to operate the program in 
some states but not in others.  The new federal program also rarely occupies 
the entire field, and so substantial regulatory power often remains, as it 
historically had been, under exclusive state control. 
The 1965 legislation that gave birth to Medicare and Medicaid offers a 
quintessential example of this type of federal policy development.35  The 
health-policy backdrop to the Social Security Act of 1965 was essentially a 
system of limited charity care provided by the states and localities to the 
“deserving poor.”  Conservative Republicans and Southern Democrats, both 
concerned about federal-government aggrandizement, opposed expansion 
of the federal government into health care.  As a result, during the federal 
legislative process, non-southern Democrats focused on incremental 
 
 34. Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of “Muddling Through,” 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 
79, 84 (1959). 
 35. See Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
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expansion, targeting their efforts at a particularly sympathetic population 
(the elderly) as beneficiaries of the new federal health insurance program. 
The resulting compromise has been described as a “three-layer cake,”36 a 
metaphor that captures its inclusion of, among other things, both federal- 
and state-led insurance models.  The decision to lodge what became 
Medicaid in the states was partially the result of the kind of path 
dependence described above37:  Even though the new program was a 
federal program, it was state run, and as such was viewed as an extension of 
prior state charity-care efforts, rather than as a major reform of them.38  But 
making Medicaid state administered also was an effort to prevent further 
federal encroachment:  federalism proponents wished to “put a fence around 
Medicare,”39 treating that program as an exceptional federal venture into 
the health care arena and maintaining state control as the norm.  This 
deserves emphasis.  Designing a federal law so that it could be implemented 
by the states was seen as protective of federalism.  Completing the 
fragmentation, the statute left large swaths of regulation entirely in state 
hands, including the regulation of the private insurance industry.40 
The same story can be told outside the health care arena.  Indeed, one is 
hard-pressed to identify any examples of major social policy legislation in 
which Congress wiped the slate clean of all preexisting state structures and 
enacted comprehensive, federal-only reform in a single legislative effort.  
From the near half-century transformation of the state-administered federal 
food-stamp program—incremental change that occurred through a series of 
federally authorized state experiments (“demonstration projects”) and 
congressional amendments;41 to the enactment of the Supplemental  
Security Income Program as an effort to standardize the state-led  Old-Age 
Assistance and Aid to the Blind programs;42 to the early federal efforts to 
fund state environmental programs that eventually led to the Clean Air and 
Clean Water Acts;43 to the 1935 Social Security Act’s  evolution from an 
 
 36. STUART ALTMAN & DAVID SHACTMAN, POWER, POLITICS, AND UNIVERSAL HEALTH 
CARE:  THE INSIDE STORY OF A CENTURY-LONG BATTLE 139 (2011). 
 37. Nicole Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 431, 445–47 
(2012). 
 38. Id. 
 39. ALTMAN & SHACTMAN, supra note 36, at 141. 
 40. State control over private insurance essentially continued until the 1974 ERISA 
statute partially eroded it. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 
93-406, § 514, 88 Stat. 829, 897 (1974) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2006)). 
 41. Food Security Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-198, 99 Stat. 1354 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 7, 15, 16, and 21 U.S.C.); Hunger Prevention Act of 1988, Pub. L. 
No. 100-435, 102 Stat. 1645 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.). 
 42. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2639 n.23 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, 
concurring in judgment in part, and dissenting in part). 
 43. The first Federal Clean Air Act, enacted in 1963, provided grants to state and local 
air pollution control districts. Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963).  The first Federal 
Clean Water Act of 1948 (also known as the Federal Water Pollution Control Act) was 
“primarily based on state and local efforts.” The Clean Water Act:  Protecting and Restoring 
our Nation’s Waters, EPA, http://water.epa.gov/action/cleanwater40/cwa101.cfm (last 
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effort to replace state old-age pension programs to its expanded form 
today,44 this is the common arc of modern federal policy development. 
Moreover, there is a cycle here, one in which state-based federal policy 
incrementalism continues to perpetuate itself.  With each new federal 
program that relies on state implementation, state administrative 
bureaucracies are further expanded and become more expert.  This, in turn, 
makes their continuing utilization by the federal government more likely. 
The ACA is no exception.  Despite the Court’s emphasis on the statute’s 
length and scope, the ACA’s main components are drawn from preexisting 
programs (which themselves were the product of an incremental legislative 
approach).  The ACA expands Medicare, Medicaid, and the private 
insurance system, rather than putting in place the kind of more coherent 
structure one would expect (and many had hoped for) had Congress been 
drafting from scratch.  In so doing, Congress perpetuated, rather than 
dismantled, the entrenched and fragmented structure of health 
administration and continued to rely heavily on state bureaucracies. 
In this sense, the incremental way in which Congress legislates reinforces 
the centrality of state administration.  Interestingly, the Chief Justice 
himself recognized this state-entrenchment point in his opinion, noting that 
“the States have developed intricate statutory and administrative regimes 
over the course of many decades to implement their objectives under 
existing Medicaid.”45  But the Chief Justice viewed that pattern as evidence 
only that states may become trapped in federal programs, rather than also as 
a potential tool through which states may preserve their centrality in and 
leverage over future federal legislation. 
2.  Incrementalism and State Experimentation 
Federal policy incrementalism also finds its expression in policy 
experimentalism, and this is another way in which the states remain relevant 
to the development of federal statutory law.  The notion that Congress lacks 
competence to address the complex social problems on its plate is 
commonplace, as is the notion that this complexity leads Congress to rely 
on expert federal agencies rather than drafting detailed legislative solutions.  
Less often acknowledged, however, is the way in which intrastatutory 
federalism serves a similar purpose.  Part of what motivates legislative 
incrementalism is a lack of information about the “best” policy answer46 
and a related desire to test policies before expanding upon them.  State 
administration of federal law is a modern-era twist on the historical concept 
 
visited Feb. 15, 2013) (citing Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 80-845, 62 Stat. 1155 
(1948)). 
 44. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2639 n.23 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in 
judgment in part, and dissenting in part). 
 45. Id. at 2604. 
 46. See Allen Rostron, Incrementalism, Comprehensive Rationality, and the Future of 
Gun Control, 67 MD. L. REV. 511, 516 (2008). 
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of the “states as laboratories”47 and allows for more policy experimentation 
than federal administration alone. 
The ACA, for instance, has an extraordinary number of pilot projects 
written into the law.48  These pilot projects are directed at policy questions 
for which Congress had no definitive answers (such as how to reduce costs 
without sacrificing quality of care).  The ACA also evinces an explicit 
preference for state policy experimentation within the confines of the new 
federal law.  Like countless other cooperative federalism programs, the 
ACA encourages states to experiment with how they choose to implement 
the new federal statute.  In the context of the ACA’s insurance-exchange 
provisions alone, the statute mentions “state flexibility” six times49 and 
explicitly contemplates that the exchanges will look different across the 
states.  Like No Child Left Behind,50 Medicaid,51 the Clean Air Act,52 and 
many other federal programs, the ACA also has a waiver provision that 
permits states, with permission, to substitute their own programs to 
accomplish the federal statute’s goal.53 
As students of federalism well know, the states’ role as “laboratories” of 
experimentation is one of the most frequently touted benefits of state 
sovereignty.54  But this mode of experimentation increasingly does not 
come from sovereignty-emphasizing federalism.  Scholars have illustrated 
that states do not conduct experiments at the levels thought ideal by 
policymakers when states are left to their own devices.55  The dearth of 
state-led policy experimentation is due to, among other things, the 
disincentives for a single state to bear all the costs of innovation and the 
risk that businesses will leave a state if it regulates in a more costly manner 
than others.  Federal laws that allow for state experimentation provide an 
answer to this problem, and, ironically, such federal laws thereby help 
“federalism” realize its potential.  Indeed, some of the most important state 
 
 47. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous 
State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic 
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”). 
 48. See Vince Kuraitis, Pilots, Demonstration & Innovation in the PPACA Health 
Reform Legislation, E-CAREMANAGEMENT BLOG (Mar. 28, 2010), http://e-caremanagement
.com/pilots-demonstrations-innovation-in-the-ppaca-healthcare-reform-legislation. 
 49. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 1311, 1321, 
1331, 1411, 1412, 124 Stat. 119, 186, 199, 231 (2010) (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 18041, 18051, 18082 (Supp. V 2011)). 
 50. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, § 9401, 115 Stat. 1425, 
1972–75 (2002) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 7861 (2006)). 
 51. 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (2006). 
 52. Id. § 7543(b). 
 53. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1332 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18052 
(Supp. V 2011)). 
 54. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 55. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection:  Does Federalism Promote 
Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593, 594, 610–11 (1980); Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm 
Feeley, Federalism:  Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 925–26 
(1994). See generally David A. Super, Laboratories of Destitution:  Democratic 
Experimentalism and the Failure of Antipoverty Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 541 (2008). 
 2013] FEDERALISM FROM FEDERAL STATUTES 1765 
policy experiments of the modern era have been conducted in the course of 
state administration of federal law. 
There is a long history of federal law developing in reaction to and in 
dialogue with these state-led federal-policy experiments.  In the 
environmental context, for instance, satisfactory levels of state innovation 
in the area of air-pollution control did not occur organically, even with the 
promise of federal funds, until Congress passed the major environmental 
statutes of the 1970s that effectively required the states to take the lead or 
have their air-quality laws preempted by federal statute.  And in the 
Medicaid context, it was the states that first took advantage of that 
program’s flexibility to expand the benefits-eligible population beyond the 
federal statute’s initial target of children and their mothers.  These state 
experiments, supported and incentivized by the federal government, formed 
the basis of Medicaid’s subsequent national expansions to cover those same 
populations. 
So, too, the philosophy behind the ACA’s own Medicaid expansion—
eligibility based on an income threshold rather than demographic 
categories—was first pioneered as a Medicaid state option by a few 
aggressive states.  The Massachusetts health reform law56—the law on 
which much of the ACA was based—was itself made possible by a 
Medicaid waiver granted by the Bush Administration.57  All of these are 
examples of experimentalism that derives from intrastatutory federalism, 
not from federalism in its traditional form. 
IV.  THE COURT’S OLD-FASHIONED FEDERALISM 
The way in which federal policy incrementalism perpetuates a central 
role for the states has obvious salience for the Court’s holding in the health 
reform case.  A majority of Justices have now erected a barrier to that kind 
of legislative incrementalism—a barrier that may undermine the very state 
authority that the Court sought to advance.  Seven Justices took the position 
that Congress does not have control over the amendment of its own federal 
programs when the states are its chosen administrative partners.58  Instead, 
the Court held that those state partners are sometimes entitled to reject the 
statutory amendment and still remain part of the pre-amendment version of 
the program.59  Applied to the ACA, the decision means that states are free 
to reject the ACA’s expansion of Medicaid but may continue to participate 
in the pre-ACA version of Medicaid, even though that is a version that 
Congress abandoned when it passed the reform bill. 
As a matter of structural formalism, there is something bizarre about this 
holding once one understands this modern federalism as a federalism that 
essentially is shaped by Congress.  So understood, and as elaborated below, 
 
 56. 2006 Mass. Acts ch. 58. 
 57. Ryan Lizza, Romney’s Dilemma, NEW YORKER, June 6, 2011, at 38, 40. 
 58. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607 (2012) (opinion of Roberts, C.J., joined by Breyer & 
Kagan, JJ.); id. at 2666–67 (joint dissent). 
 59. Id. at 2607–08 (majority opinion). 
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one might expect the Court to impose certain hurdles for the legislative 
process to clear if Congress wishes to utilize state partners.  But there is 
something strange about the Court allowing the states effectively to create 
and participate in their own version of a federal program—by virtue of 
refusing to participate in Congress’s amended version—when the states had 
no right to participate in the program in the first place. 
On a practical level, moreover, the decision risks creating precisely the 
wrong kinds of legislative incentives from the standpoint of those who 
would further state power.  To be sure, it is possible that the next time 
Congress wishes to accomplish an insurance expansion it will enlist the 
states’ help relatively condition-free (for example, using the block grants 
popular with old-fashioned federalists).  Or perhaps it will think twice about 
legislating at all.  The Court itself has noted, in a 1986 case about the 
incremental expansion of Social Security benefits, that a “constitutional rule 
that would invalidate Congress’s attempts to proceed cautiously in 
awarding increased benefits might deter Congress from making any 
increases at all.”60  These sorts of outcomes—namely, stymying legislation 
altogether or allowing the states to regulate with few federal strings—are 
likely the kinds of outcomes that the Court’s federalists desire. 
But it also is possible that, the next time, Court-watching statutory 
drafters will still decide to legislate and, to steer clear of the Court’s new 
constitutional obstacle, will do so in a more nationalist manner.  This would 
not be the federalists’ desired result.  It is true that the Medicaid challenge 
in the ACA case was brought by some states themselves, but half of the 
states argued the other side, and no modern federalism proponents today are 
advocating nationalizing Medicaid.  Such an idea (an effective “Medicare 
for all”) has been anathema to federalists at least since Ronald Reagan 
famously associated that possibility with “socialized medicine.”61 
In fact, it was federalism proponents who supported the creation of the 
state-led Medicaid program in the first place, as part of the Social Security 
Act’s 1965 legislative compromise, just as it was the more traditionally 
federalist house of Congress, the Senate, that insisted that the ACA’s 
insurance exchanges be operated by the states instead of the federal 
government.  It is also no coincidence that, now that the Court has upheld 
the rest of the ACA, some policymakers are invoking “federalism” to try to 
convince states to establish their own health insurance exchanges under the 
Act rather than letting the federal government operate the exchanges for 
them.  As one governor put it:  “[A] federally facilitated exchange is not the 
ideal approach.  Regulating the insurance market is a power best left in the 
hands of the states.”62  A well-known conservative economist has argued 
 
 60. Bowen v. Owens, 476 U.S. 340, 348 (1986). 
 61. Ronald Reagan Speaks Out Against Socialized Medicine, YOUTUBE (Aug. 1, 2007), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fRdLpem-AAs (audio of 1961 LP of the same name). 
 62. Elizabeth Crisp, Federal Government Will Start Setting Up Missouri’s Health 
Exchange, ST. LOUIS TODAY (Nov. 12, 2012), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/govt-and-
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that allowing the federal government to operate the state exchanges would 
open the door to a nationally run health care program.63  Of course, now 
that the ACA has been upheld, as a formal (constitutional) matter, the 
federal government is regulating the insurance market regardless.  But as 
these comments reveal, in today’s world, both as a practical matter and also 
as a matter of how a program is understood and experienced, which level of 
government is doing the implementing of federal law is, indeed, a question 
about federalism. 
The Court’s decision also may unproductively incentivize 
comprehensive, rather than incremental, lawmaking.  This is because the 
decision effectively tells Congress that it may not be able to amend federal 
programs later if Congress still wishes to use state administrators.  Putting 
aside the political impossibility of such comprehensive lawmaking on a 
routine basis, it also seems remarkably unwise given the complexity of 
modern legislative problems.  One benefit of incrementalism is its 
reversibility.  State-led federal policy incrementalism, moreover, is 
particularly reversible because the experimentation often occurs on a 
smaller scale.64 
It is something of a mystery why a Supreme Court so concerned with the 
expansion of federal power would obstruct gradual, state-led federal policy 
development in this manner.  The most plausible explanation is that the 
Court wished to turn back the tide of major federal legislation altogether; or 
perhaps the Court simply took particular offense at the policy choices in 
this statute.  As noted, the Chief Justice’s opinion and the joint dissent are 
laced with distaste for the social solidarity model that the ACA embraces, 
and both condemned the Medicaid expansion for its role in this effort.  But 
even those Justices acknowledged that the days of only minor federal-law 
intrusions into daily American life have long since passed. 
A.  Nationalism or State Leverage? 
Let us now examine the other side of this coin.  State administration of 
federal law does not always work to empower the states.  Instead, state 
administration may offer the federal government a subtle path toward 
encroachment on state terrain.65  Relatedly, it may be a way for Congress to 
obscure its political accountability for particularly unpopular decisions.  In 
such contexts, intrastatutory federalism may have a nationalizing, not 
federalizing, effect. 
 
politics/political-fix/federal-government-will-start-setting-up-missouri-s-health-exchange/
article_4bee6ae8-6b8d-5c6c-9ecf-e90dd36234b6.html (statement of Gov. Jay Nixon). 
 63. See Douglas Holtlz-Eakin, Yes to State Exchanges, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Dec. 6, 
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The seven Justices who voted to strike down the Medicaid expansion 
focused especially on these arguments about accountability, encroachment, 
and the diminishment of independent state power.  But their specific 
arguments seemed ill tailored to the matters at hand.  The Justices’ focus on 
accountability, for example, translates badly to the doctrinal test that they 
articulated, which effectively allows Congress to engage in small-scale—
and therefore less visible—expansions of cooperative federalist programs 
but holds that larger changes raise constitutional concerns.  If anything, the 
public is more likely to know where to place blame for major, not minor, 
changes. 
With respect to traditional state functions, the joint dissent emphasized 
that allowing the Medicaid expansion “would permit Congress to dictate 
policy in areas traditionally governed primarily at the state or local level.”66  
This concern, however, ignores the fact that Congress can use its broad 
power to tax and spend for the general welfare67 in areas of traditional state 
control regardless of whether the states are co-implementers.  Medicare is 
precisely such an effort. 
And with respect to the balance of powers, the Chief Justice emphasized 
the “independent power of the States . . . as a check on the power of the 
Federal Government.”68  But the Court seemed wrong to invoke state 
“independence” as a real-world limitation on federal authority.  Once one 
accepts, as the Court did, that Congress has extremely broad power to 
regulate by itself (if it is willing to use the taxing power), the best chance 
that the states have to limit or shape the federalization of government 
functions is via their representation in Congress and through their role as 
implementers of federal law.  States must protect their power through the 
national political process, rather than by offering an alternative to it.  If 
anything, the famous “political safeguards of federalism”69 have special 
salience here. 
The joint dissent did recognize that Congress has become dependent on 
state implementation.70  Although the Justices did not see political leverage 
in that dependence, others have.  Numerous scholars have described how 
the states exert formidable political power over the shape of the federal laws 
they are designated to implement.71  It was no coincidence that the National 
Governors Association and the National Association of [State] Insurance 
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Commissioners were active political operators as the ACA was developed 
and that their efforts had a real effect on how the statute was drafted. 
A separate and much more difficult question is who “speaks” for the 
states in the political process (votes in the Senate? The National Governors 
Association? Amicus Brief sign-ons? etc.) or whether it even makes sense 
to think of “the states” as a single unit, with unified interests, when in fact 
states often take different sides on federalism-related questions (here, too, 
the ACA is no exception).72  Some states also may have disproportionate 
power relative to others.73  As one particularly famous example of the 
difficulty of evaluating the question of whether any specific federal statute 
is state protective, recall the high-profile federalism case New York v. 
United States, in which the Court invalided as violative of federalism a 
federal statutory scheme that was constructed by a coalition of state 
governors, speaking for the majority of the National Governors Association, 
as an effort to preserve state power.74 
These difficulties, however, are not a reason for the Court to incentivize 
Congress to leave the states out of its legislative schemes.  Instead, they are 
difficulties related to how legal doctrines should be constructed.  They 
reveal the kinds of questions attendant to understanding and evaluating 
modern federal-state relations, and the Court’s opinion in the ACA case 
offers no roadmap for answering them. 
The Chief Justice likewise missed the most important point when he 
disputed Justice Ginsburg’s contention that the extent of Congress’s 
constitutional power to expand Medicaid is proven by the fact that Congress 
could replace the statute altogether.75  The Chief Justice wrote that 
“[p]ractical constraints would plainly inhibit, if not preclude, the Federal 
Government from repealing the existing program and putting every feature 
 
 72. Thanks to Judith Resnik for a clarifying conversation on this point. 
 73. Lynn A. Baker, Putting the Safeguards Back into the Political Safeguards of 
Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 951, 966 (2001) (arguing that the structure of the Senate 
“ensures small population states a disproportionately large slice, and large population states 
a disproportionately small slice, of the federal fiscal and regulatory ‘pie’” and so “obviously 
infringes on the autonomy of the states that are burdened by, rather than beneficiaries of, this 
redistribution.”). 
 74. See Brief for the Respondent, New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (Nos. 
91-543, 91-558, 91-563), 1992 WL 526126, at *4–5 (“A task force headed by seven 
Governors, working under the auspices of the National Governors’ Association (NGA), 
proposed a ‘state solution’ to the [low-level radioactive waste] disposal problem, which the 
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New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 150–51 (1992) (“Relying largely on a report 
submitted by the National Governors’ Association, . . . Congress declared a federal policy of 
holding each State ‘responsible for providing for the availability of capacity either within or 
outside the State for the disposal of low-level radioactive waste generated within its borders’ 
. . . .” (citations omitted)).  Ironically, even New York supported the legislation. See Judith 
Resnik, Joshua Civin & Joseph Frueh, Ratifying Kyoto at the Local Level:  Sovereigntism, 
Federalism, and Translocal Organizations of Government Actors (TOGAS), 50 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 709, 749–51, (2008). 
 75. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2629 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the 
judgment in part, and dissenting in part). 
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of Medicaid on the table for political reconsideration.”76  But what are those 
“practical constraints” if not the same informal, political—and not 
constitutional—federalism constraints of the sort that this Essay has 
emphasized?  State opposition to a wholesale elimination of Medicaid 
would be fierce.  Such a move, if the federal government then nationalized 
the program, also would be perceived as a massive federal-government 
takeover, even though as a formal matter it would be no different, since 
Medicaid is a federal program in the first place.  The predicted political 
upheaval is what makes the repeal of Medicaid a practical (but not 
constitutional) impossibility.  This is modern federalism at work. 
Indeed, the very fact that each of the opinions in the case is full of such 
“practical” arguments illustrates that we are talking about something other 
than sovereignty-based federalism.  (For another example, consider the 
dissent’s listing of the “practical reasons” preventing the states from 
declining Medicaid funds, including the political difficulty of levying state 
taxes to replace the lost federal money.77)  As proof positive, the Court 
could not, and in fact explicitly refused to, draw a doctrinal line to 
demarcate the point at which congressional expansions of state-
administered federal programs become coercive.  Instead, the Court 
articulated a virtually unadministrable rule that recognizes the power of the 
federal government to amend its state-led programs as it wishes so long as 
the amendments are not too “dramati[c].”78  The “we-know-it-when-we-
see-it” quality of this doctrine does not fit well with a theory of federalism 
that depends on hard boundaries. 
V.  FEDERALISM AS A DOCTRINE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
This Essay has focused on the unrealistic assumptions about federalism 
that underlie the Court’s opinion.  How legal doctrine might evolve to 
effectuate the different vision of federalism that I have offered requires 
many more pages and much deeper consideration.  But I wish to conclude 
with one particular point about the direction that such doctrine might take, 
and that is to emphasize that statutory, not constitutional, doctrines seem a 
better fit for this context. 
The Court has recognized this before:  it has created a multitude of 
statutory interpretation doctrines in the name of “federalism” that are not 
really about the traditional, hard-boundary federalism that the health care 
decision tried to resurrect.  To take just one of many possible examples, the 
presumption against preemption is a frequently employed rule of statutory 
interpretation that requires Congress to be clear when it wishes to legislate 
over (i.e., preempt) existing state law.  The presumption is employed when 
Congress unquestionably has the authority to preempt and so is not about 
any constitutional boundary.  It is, rather, a statutory interpretation doctrine 
 
 76. Id. at 2606 n.14 (majority opinion). 
 77. Id. at 2657 (joint dissent). 
 78. Id. at 2606. 
 2013] FEDERALISM FROM FEDERAL STATUTES 1771 
that acknowledges Congress’s discretion to move the line of state-federal 
regulatory authority, but demands a more public, accountable, and 
deliberative federal political process—by requiring Congress to be 
particularly explicit—when it does so. 
The Court has devised similar rules that require Congress to speak extra 
clearly when it legislates in areas of traditional state authority or wishes to 
abrogate state sovereign immunity.  It is no fluke that each of these 
doctrines emerged within the last century.  Unlike many other American 
statutory interpretation rules, which have traditions going back to old 
English practice, these doctrines are the interpretive rules of the modern 
regulatory state.  They are a direct judicial response to the way that the New 
Deal changed how federalism works. 
The doctrine at issue in health reform’s Medicaid expansion was 
precisely one of these informal, federalism-protective rules of statutory 
interpretation.  The so-called Pennhurst rule79 requires Congress to speak 
clearly when it attaches strings to grants of federal money to the states.  
Though most often taught in constitutional-law courses, Pennhurst is also a 
statutory-interpretation doctrine.  At bottom, the rule is about Congress’s 
intentions and the clarity with which Congress speaks, not about the limits 
of Congress’s authority.  Pennhurst tells us that Congress has the discretion 
to attach whatever (legal) conditions it likes to its statutes, as long as it 
makes those conditions clear. 
The Court applied the Pennhurst rule in the ACA case but did not truly 
follow it.  The Court recognized that Congress included the clear statement 
that Pennhurst requires:  the Medicaid statute expressly reserves to 
Congress the “right to alter, amend, or repeal any provision” of the 
statute.80  But the Court layered on top of that rule its muddy, “some-
changes-are-too-much-regardless-of-the-warning” doctrine that now makes 
it impossible for Congress to predict when it will be invoked. 
One explanation for the cloudiness of the ACA’s new rule may be the 
Court’s reluctance to go further down the road of acknowledging federalism 
as a creature of Congress’s creation.  Pennhurst suggested that the threat to 
state sovereignty is eliminated when Congress makes its intentions plain.  
Perhaps the Court was no longer content to rest with that rule because the 
Court realized that the Pennhurst doctrine is much more about federal 
statutory design than about state sovereignty in the first place. 
Indeed, the entire ACA opinion contains this tension.  The Court moved 
uneasily between recognizing Congress’s broad power to legislate and 
attempting to protect the historical limits on that power.  Consider, for 
example, how this tension between modern statutory power and traditional 
constitutional restraints is evident in the Court’s decision on the insurance-
purchase-mandate question. There, the Court claimed to apply a rule of 
statutory interpretation, the so-called doctrine of constitutional avoidance, 
 
 79. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1, 17 (1981). 
 80. 42 U.S.C. § 1304 (2006). 
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to save the mandate from unconstitutionality by “interpreting” it as a tax.81  
The Court then walked an awkward line by holding that Congress has the 
power to control the labels that it uses for some purposes, but not for 
others.82  Throughout, the Chief Justice invoked the importance of state 
sovereignty six times.83 
It is constitutional heresy to suggest that the concept of state sovereignty 
might be a poor fit, even when we are talking about a federal legislative 
landscape in which the states play a role only at Congress’s discretion.  But 
to press the point, the states are not the only implementers of federal 
statutes.  Congress also routinely relies on nonprofits, quasi-governmental 
associations and for-profit entities to implement federal law.  No one 
contends that those players are sovereigns in any sense, even though their 
role in federal statutory implementation is often quite similar to that of the 
states. 
None of this is to say that the states are not important players in our 
government structure or that sovereignty is not a relevant concept to 
describe many other aspects of the states’ existence (such as their control of 
their own government structures).  This is an argument about how, 
realistically, state policymaking can remain productive and relevant within 
the ever-expanding landscape of federal lawmaking. 
Of course, not everyone agrees that states should be aggressive national 
policymakers in the first place, and each context is unique.  But even those 
who generally resist federalism might focus closer attention on state 
implementation of federal law and, in particular, on the parallel between 
state and private implementation noted above.  If one alternative to state-led 
federal statutory schemes is a bigger federal government, another 
alternative is more privatization of what previously had been government 
work.  Many scholars have raised accountability, transparency, and 
democracy concerns associated with this trend toward privatization.  One 
might consider whether state implementation is preferable to privatization; 
indeed, whether state implementation is a buffer to the withdrawal of 
government altogether.84  So understood, state implementation of federal 
law is a phenomenon that both nationalists and federalists may have interest 
in preserving. 
 
 81. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2600–01.  In my view, however, the Court did not apply the 
doctrine properly.  The doctrine is best understood as an aid in the interpretation of 
ambiguous statutory language, not as an aid in choosing among several constitutional hooks 
for text whose meaning is clear. 
 82. See id. Specifically, the Court held that it would respect Congress’s decision to call 
the “tax” a “penalty” for purposes of whether the Anti-Injunction Act’s prohibition on pre-
enforcement challenges applied, but that it would decide for itself whether the mandate was 
a “tax” for purposes of Congress’s power to enact it in the first place. 
 83. See id. at 2578, 2602–03. 
 84. See Judith Resnik, Globalization(s), Privatization(s), Constitutionalizations, and 
Statization:  Icons and Experiences of Sovereignty in the 21st century, 11 INT’L J. CONST. L. 
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Consider in this light, then, some statutory-law alternatives to 
sovereignty-focused constitutional-law doctrine.  I have argued previously 
that one of the most important, but often ignored, federalism relationships 
on the ground is the intergovernmental administrative relationship; the 
relative power of federal administrators over the state administrators 
concurrently entrusted with implementing federal laws.85  The Constitution 
has nothing explicit to tell us about how tightly federal agencies can tie 
their state partners’ hands when Congress asks both federal and state 
administrators to co-regulate.  But statutory interpretation doctrine might.  
We already have statutory interpretation rules that give federal agencies 
leeway to implement federal laws, and similar rules could be developed that 
give such deference to state implementers or that even change the balance 
of power at times between federal and state agencies.  My own recent 
empirical work with Lisa Bressman suggests the possibility that Congress 
sometimes does intend to give state implementers more policy-
implementation discretion than that for which current doctrine allows.86 
In fact, the ambiguities currently attendant to these interagency 
relationships are precisely what have been cited in the health reform context 
as the reason for some states’ refusals to operate their own insurance 
exchanges.  States claim that they do not have enough information about 
how much discretion they will have to implement the statute themselves or 
what rules the Department of Health and Human Services will impose on 
them.87  States have voiced similar concerns with respect to other parts of 
the statute.88  None of these concerns stems from arguments about 
constitutional boundaries—that is, about the federal government’s power to 
regulate in the area in the first place.  Rather, these are arguments about 
how state implementation will be operationalized and the respective powers 
of state and federal agencies, all within statutes that everyone agrees 
Congress has legitimately enacted.  Current legal doctrine, however, does 
not assist in regulating these relationships. 
In a similar vein, Professor Erin Ryan has argued that legal doctrine 
should oversee the fairness of the political bargaining process—the behind-
the-scenes negotiations between state and federal actors—and not the 
contours of the ultimate result.89  The Court-created federalism “clear-
statement rules” already in play and discussed above are of the same order:  
those rules do not prohibit any particular policy outcome.  Rather, they are 
an effort to shape the legislative process, and to give additional leverage to 
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federalist voices in how statutes are designed.90  Those who have raised 
concerns about asymmetries across the horizontal-federalism landscape 
might similarly think more about how the statutory design process might be 
restructured to better equalize power across states. 
Admittedly, each of these paths may plunge courts precisely into the kind 
of political terrain that courts generally eschew.  But that discomfort—and 
the recognition that the political arena is where these boundaries 
increasingly must be worked out—would seem a reason for courts further to 
limit their intervention in Congress’s statutory work, and not a reason for 
courts to rely on antiquated constitutional doctrine to provide them with a 
more familiar, even if inapposite, path to decision. 
It also is exceedingly difficult to determine when a particular federal 
statutory structure is in the “state interest,” not only because the states are 
not always a cohesive unit, but also because what the metric might be is not 
clear.  Federalism is associated with many different kinds of benefits, and 
different federal statutes generate different packages of those benefits. 
Some statutes, for example, may encourage more local participation but less 
experimentation, while others do the opposite.  Who is to say which statute 
is “sufficiently” federalist?  In the health reform context, for example, we 
do not yet have enough information to evaluate the question of how state-
protective the health-insurance exchange provisions ultimately will be. 
What we can say, however, is that thanks to the ACA’s intrastatutory 
federalism, Massachusetts now is operating an insurance exchange through 
which it can screen and exclude insurance plans offered, while Utah 
simultaneously has chosen to operate an open-market model exchange in 
which all insurers are welcome.  That diversity and deference to local 
governmental preferences likely would not have been possible in a single 
federal model.  There is something that rings of federalism here, but is it 
“enough” (and enough for what)?  Ultimately, our modern federalism may 
best be understood as existing on a continuum rather than as a feature that is 
either present or absent from a regulatory scheme. 
One final point:  if federalism doctrine ultimately does move toward rules 
aimed at how Congress drafts statutes rather than constitutional rules that 
police outcomes, it will be incumbent upon the Court to adhere to the 
statutory rules that it announces.  One of the most important, and 
unanswered, questions for modern statutory law is the extent to which 
Congress and the Court are in dialogue over statutory interpretation; that is, 
the extent to which Congress legislates in the shadow of the Court’s 
interpretive doctrines and the extent to which the Court, in turn, respects 
Congress’s intentions.91  Any set of legal rules that aims to make Congress 
speak more clearly must be heard and employed by legislative drafters.  In 
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the context of the Medicaid expansion, the Court damaged its own 
credibility as a reliable partner in that dialectical relationship by saying “not 
good enough” when Congress employed precisely the kind of disclaimer for 
which the Court previously had asked. 
CONCLUSION 
Traditional federalists embrace state power in the absence, or instead, of 
federal authority.  And they view autonomy as the ballgame.  It is this 
traditional federalism that the Court wished to resuscitate in the ACA 
litigation.  But that option was never on the political table when it came to 
designing the health reform statute.  The congressional majority that passed 
the ACA was convinced that national legislation was necessary.  And so 
Congress proceeded as it typically does, changing national policy by 
building on already-existing federal laws that themselves were the result of 
incremental federal legislation over a backdrop of historical state control.  
The outcome was major federal legislation that, instead of marginalizing the 
states, kept them front and center.  The Court misread the ACA as a statute 
that is fundamentally anti-state, when in fact it is state empowering in many 
respects.  The ACA creates precisely the kinds of partnerships that maintain 
the states’ relevance in the modern statutory era, and the federalists may 
wish to think twice before again discouraging them. 
